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Abstract
This paper oﬀers a general equilibrium model to analyze the problem of investment
in R&D of firms that also face the decision between outsourcing and "in-house"
production in the presence of R&D information leakage. A contractor hired by a
firm learns the firm’s technology and can diﬀuse the information to other firms,
either by selling it or by “spilling” it involuntarily. I find that information leakage
concerns have the tendency to concentrate the outsourcing market with respect to
a situation in which information leakage is not an issue. In particular, despite the
fact that the original outsourcing market is perfectly competitive, I find that when a
market for information arises in equilibrium, such a market is always monopolistic.
I show that a market for information arises when contractors have a positive but
low degree of control on the information they hold. If contractors do not have
any control on the information they hold, the market splits into a positive measure
of technologically advanced firms that never outsource and a positive measure of
low-tech firms that always outsource. If contractors have full information control,
all firms invest in technology and outsource, and a market for information never
arises. As the contractors’ degree of control on information increases, the equilibrium
technology level decreases and the set of firms that adopt such technology increases.
The structure of the equilibria of the model captures several features observable in
the management consulting industry.
1 Introduction
This is an era in which R&D development has emerged as one of the firm’s most
valuable assets. As a consequence, protecting the secrecy of R&D information is
a crucial concern in industrial organization.1 While close monitoring and career
concerns can help to mitigate the leakage of information caused by its own employees,
a firm is particularly vulnerable to this problem when it interacts with the external
world, and in particular when outsiders collaborate in the production process.2
On the other hand, a vast literature documents how firms rely on outsourcing for
an expanding number of productive activities, including even temporary workers.3
Increasing specialization and economies of scale induce firms to outsource services
that used to be typically performed in-house in the past. When a firm hires an
external contractor information sharing is often a necessity, and, even when it is
not, the close relationship with a contractor can result in an involuntary information
leakage. Thus, external contractors may end up aggregating valuable information
coming from the pool of their clients, and as a result other firms may have an
incentive to hire the same contractors to have access to that same information. In
light of the possibility of information leakage, it is somehow puzzling that firms with
high technology levels still seem to rely on outsourcing.
This paper aims to explore the role of contractors as information intermediaries
and the trade-oﬀ between hiring eﬃcient contractors and protecting R&D informa-
tion from expropriation. In particular, this paper addresses the impact of such a
trade-oﬀ on the R&D investment and information diﬀusion in an industry and on the
size and structure of the outsourcing market. Since the information that contractors
1See Levin and alt. (1987) for a survey that shows how firms rely on secrecy rather than
intellectual property rights to appropriate the returns of their R&D investment.
2See Rajan and Zingales (2001), Zabojnik (2002), Baccara and Razin (2002) and Baccara
(2002) for analyses of situations in which a firm’s employees (or former employees) can leak crucial
information outside the firm.
3Among others, see Feenstra (1998), Tempest (1996), Helper (1991), Abraham and Taylor
(1996), Grossman and Helpman (2000, 2001), World Trade Organization Report (1998). For
temporary help supply (THS), see Estevao and Lach (1999).
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acquire and how much that information is valued depends on the strategic choices
of all their clients, this paper tackles these questions using a general equilibrium
approach. The model allows to derive the market value of information and to study
the characteristics of the downstream market for information that can endogenously
arise in equilibrium.
I develop a model in which firms invest in cost-cutting technology and operate
in a monopolistic competitive market. The production of each firm’s good includes
two stages: the first stage of production consists of a fixed task. Such task can
be performed either in-house or by a specialized contractor, and it is the same
for all firms. The “task” represents any stage of production that can in principle
be outsourced, including professional services, IT consulting, accounting, inputs
manufacturing, and so on. The contractor is selected among the ones that populate a
perfectly competitive outsourcing market. If a firm hires a contractor, the contractor
learns the technology developed by the firm. The second stage of production can
be only completed in-house and its (variable) cost is determined by the technology
available to each firm.
Once a contractor learns a technology, and before the second stage of production
takes place, the technology may “leak” to some competing firms. The information
leakage can occur in two fundamental ways: first, a contractor may not have perfect
control on the information he learns. This lack of control determines a spill of
information to a fixed measure of other firms. Second, each contractor can post a
price for the information he holds and sell it to other firms.
The (exogenous) magnitude of the spill measures the ability of the contractors
to protect and market the information they hold. Sometimes, contractors may not
have the expertise both to understand the value of such information and to sell it
on the market. Other times, the geographical concentration of a market (e.g., firms
in Silicon Valley), or a high employee turnover (e.g., management consulting firms)
could cause a contractor not to be able to fully control the information flows that
generates from his firm.4 A more sophisticated contractor may take measures to
4The presence of the “spill” is consistent with the observation that the resources present in
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protect the value of the information he holds and limit the spill to some degree.
A contractor has perfect control of the information when he does not generate any
spill. In this model, the magnitude of the information spill endogenously deter-
mines the demand for information and the size of the market the contractors face
as information sellers.
I study the equilibria of this model as the magnitude of the information spill
varies. First, I analyze the case in which contractors have no control over the
information they learn. In this case a market for information cannot arise, and I
identify suﬃcient conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium in which
the market splits into a positive measure of firms outsourcing and not investing in
technology and a positive measure of firms that have a high technology level but
perform all the production in-house.5
If a contractor has some degree of control over the information, there always ex-
ists a unique equilibrium in which a market for information arises. Quite strikingly,
despite the fact that the outsourcing market is perfectly competitive, the market for
information in equilibrium is always monopolistic. The intuition of this result is very
general and robust. Consider the problem of a firm that invested in R&D. This firm
also has to decide whether to hire a contractor and, in case it does, it has to select
a contractor from the ones that populate the outsourcing market. In making these
decisions, the firm has to consider the impact of its choice on the market for infor-
mation that will arise downstream. In particular, the firm always has an incentive
to distort such a market by keeping it as concentrated as possible. This is because
when the degree of competition on the market for information increases, this com-
petition drives the price for information down and, as more firms buy information
professional firms are not fully appropriable. For example, consulting firms have a very high
employees’ turnover as employees often leave the firm to work with a current or a potential client.
See Bhide (1996).
5Such equilibrium is consistent with the hardware market of the 80’s and early 90’s, when Apple
Computer famously avoided outsourcing and carefully protected its R&D investments, while PC
hardware producers adopted arguably lower technology standards and a very intensive outsourcing
activity.
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on the market, it generates a larger information leakage. On the other hand, a more
concentrated market for information guarantees a higher price for information and
more limited leakage to the rest of the market. Thus, information leakage concerns
have the tendency to concentrate the outsourcing market with respect to situations
and industries in which information leakage is not an issue.6
Moreover, when contractors face the financial constraint of posting a non-negative
price for the task, the ex-ante competition to become the information monopolist
cannot dissipate the entire surplus from the market for information. Thus, the
contractor who in equilibrium becomes the information monopolist appropriates all
the surplus of the market for information.
Finally, if the contractors have full control over the information (that is, if there
is no information spill), I show that there cannot be a market for information in
equilibrium. In this case, firms know that if they do not invest in technology, a
monopolistic contractor will be their only source to learn cost-cutting technology
in the future. If contractors cannot ex-ante commit to a price for information, the
information monopolist always prices it to extract all the information surplus. If
this is the case, firms always prefer to invest in the technology themselves rather
than wait to be charged a high price by the information monopolist. As a result,
with full information control, there is only one equilibrium in which all firms invest
in technology, outsource and there is no market for information.7
I compare the equilibrium investment and the diﬀusion of the technology under
diﬀerent degrees of contractors’ information control. I show that the technology level
reached in the market decreases as the degree of control over the information of the
6In this model, this intuition translates in the stark equilibrium outcome in which the market
for information is always a monopoly. For the generality of this intuition and the robustness of
the monopoly result to several modifications of the model, see Section 6.4.
7This suggests that consulting firms prefer to stay away from a situation in which they have
full control over the information they hold and no committment power on the price for it. This is
consistent with well-developed consulting firms’ practices of both committing to a high employees’
turnover and updating the fees they charge their clients once a year on a general (and not per-
project) basis.
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contractors increases. However, the measure of firms that adopt the technology
increases with the degree of information control.
1.1 An Example: Management Consulting Firms
While the question addressed in this paper applies to a wide range of outsourcing
activities, it can be related in a particularly interesting way to the case of the
Management Consulting industry.
In the model, contractors learn R&D information as a by-product of the main
activity (or “task”) they are hired for. If a contractor realizes the market value of
such information, and he has the capabilities to market it, he could try and sell it
to other firms.
First of all, it has been documented that several very successful management
consulting firms originated as a small consulting practice within a firm specializ-
ing in professional services such as accounting, auditing, tax filing or engineering.8
This suggests that the transition from professional service to consulting may have
been carried out to capitalize on the expertise these professionals developed in their
previous practice working at close contact with their clients.
Even the current management consulting industry fits the model quite well. It
is very diﬃcult to define the products that are traded in this industry. One of
these products is identified it with organizational ideas, another one with necessity
validate some unpopular decisions such as personnel reduction, and so on.9 How-
ever, one of the products that management consultants explicitly sell is the so-called
8McKinsey & Co. originated from “James O. McKinsey & Co.”, a firm specializing in accounting
and management engineering, and its successive merger with “Scovell, Wellington & Co.”, another
accounting firm. The first years of the partnership were characterized by a heated debate on the
decision of keeping the accounting and the consulting practices separate or under the same roof (see
Bhide (1996)). Arthur Andersen is best known as an audit and accounting firm, but its business
consulting practice is now its most successful division, growing at around 25% annually. Also, in
Europe the clients of notaries public often refer to them for business advice as well.
9See McKenna (2001) and Bhide (1996) for some informal theories of the role and added value
of management consultants.
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“best practice”.10 “Best practices” are benchmarks that are usually formulated by
aggregating the information consultants gather from their pool of clients on a given
common issue. As McKenna (2001) puts it: “Management consultants have primar-
ily functioned as disseminators of organizational ideas”. In the words of sociologists
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) “Large organizations choose from a relatively small set
of major consulting firms which, like John Appleseeds, spread a few organizational
models throughout the land”.
Suppose that a firm with some good technology related to a given function decides
to hire a management consultant for some reason (e.g., to acquire a “best practice”
related to some other function, a better organization, to validate some personnel
reduction, etc.). Once the management consultants are hired, they typically send
a team to work for a period of time that ranges from some months up to years on
location at the client’s headquarters. During their staying, this team has access to
a large portion of the firm’s private information. So, it is reasonable to think that
the firm may be worried that the good technology they hold becomes part of some
other “best practice” sold to some competitor in the future.11
Because its high labor turnover, a management consulting company typically does
not have a perfect control of the information it aggregates. Thus, the case of the
model this industry seems to match best is the case of imperfect control of infor-
mation. Quite interestingly, this is the case under which there exists a market for
information in equilibrium and information surplus appropriation by the consultant
in the long run.12
Finally, the results of the paper predict that a monopoly is the only possible
10Before being aggregated, this information is typically “sanitized” that is, the sources of every
piece of information are purged.
11A common explanation of why firms should not fear information leakage in their relationship
with management consultants comes from the consultants’ reputation concerns. However, the
“best practice” paradigm seems to be well understood and accepted, so the puzzle does not seem
to be completely explained by these arguments.
12Again, see Bhide (1996) for a discussion of high labor turnover in mamagement consulting and
the failure to appropriate the entire returns of their resources.
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equilibrium outcome when a market for information arises. Such result (or, more
generally, the intuition that information leakage concerns tend to generate concen-
tration on the market for information) is consistent with the observation that among
many accounting or auditing firms, only a fewmade a transition to become successful
consulting firms. Moreover, the management consulting industry is characterized by
high market concentration and high growth of a few market leaders. In particular,
in 2001, McKinsey had 40.6% of the market share and in the last ’90 it experienced
a growth of 20% annually. Moreover, McKinsey and its largest competitor, Booz,
Allen & Hamilton, together held almost 60% of the market in 2001.
1.2 Related literature
After Coase (1937) originally identified the “make-or-buy” decisions as the element
that defines the boundaries of a firm, and Williamson (1975, 1985) more recently
re-explored Coase’s fundamental intuition, a vast literature started to analyze such
decisions both in individual and in general industry equilibrium settings. Very in-
fluential work on this issue has been carried out by Klein and alt. (1978), Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and it has focused mainly on what is known
as the “hold-up problem”, arising from relation-specific investments and incomplete
contracts. However, as Holmstorm and Roberts (1998) have pointed out in a recent
article, explaining the boundaries of the firm only in terms of the hold-up problem
and asset-specificity seems a too narrow view for a very general issue. The aim of
this paper is to introduce a new possible perspective for “make-it-or-buy” decision,
which is based on informational concerns.13
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) analyze the evolution of a competitive industry
in which firms reduce costs by innovating or imitating their rivals’ technologies. In
the steady state, they find that the diﬀusion of the technology from the investing
13The analysis of the outsourcing decision in this paper is close to the one carried out in two
papers by Grossman and Helpman (2000, 2001) as it considers a general equilibrium model. Mayer
(2000) carries out an empirical analysis on the use of subcontractors in the IT industry and finds
that the presence of expropriable information lowers the likelihood of observing a subcontractor.
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firms to the imitating ones leads to a low level of investment. This eﬀect is present
in this paper as well. However, this paper focuses on endogenizing the mechanism
through which the information spreads and on the role of contractors as information
intermediaries.14
Another paper that analyzes the issue of property information flows in the firm-
to-firm service markets is Demski and alt. (1999). However, their focus is on the
internal organization of the service-providing firm, and the problem of designing in-
centives to discourage employees from leaking information. In this paper, I abstract
from the contractors’ internal organization, I explicitly consider the possibility of
a market for information arising in equilibrium and I study its properties and its
consequences on investment in technology.15
Finally, there is a link between the result presented in Section 4 of this paper and
the results on common agency of Bernheim and Whinston (1985). In Bernhein and
Whinston’s paper firms in competition may find useful to delegate their marketing
eﬀorts to a common agent to solve their coordination problem and enjoy a collusive
outcome. Although the idea of competitive firms using a common contractor is
similar, in this model firms use of a common contractor in the production stage to
guarantee a monopoly not on the product market, on which they still compete, but
on a diﬀerent, endogenously arising market, i.e. the market for information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2. In Section 3, I characterize the equilibria of the case in which contractors have no
control over the information. The analysis of the equilibria arising when contractors
have either some or full degree of control over the information is carried out in
Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to comparative statics, and Section 6 concludes the
paper oﬀering some suggestions for further research.
14See also Ceccagnoli (2000) for a model in which the equilibrium cost-cutting investment is af-
fected by spill-overs to competitors. Ceccagnoli studies the eﬀect of an increase in the (exogenously
given) number of imitating firms, and of new firms entry on the equilibrium investment in R&D.
15This paper is also related to the literature on the value and market for information. For very
recent contributions to this literature and more references, I refer to Anton and Yao (2002(a) and
(b)).
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2 A model of outsourcing and information leak-
age
2.1 Firms and consumers
Consider a monopolistic competitive market populated by a fixed interval of firms
N = [0, n]. The preferences of the representative consumer are described by a “Dixit-
Stiglitz” utility function16
u (y) =
Z n
0
y (i)α di
where y (i) is the consumption of the good produced by firm i ∈ N and α ∈ (0, 1).
As it is well-known, in this case the demand function for good i given its price p(i)
is
y (i) =Mp (i)−
1
1−α
with M ≡ EU n
0 p(j)
− α1−α dj
, where E is the total expenditure.
Each firm i ∈ N can invest an amount k(i) ∈ R+ in developing cost-cutting
technology.17 Such investment has the eﬀect of reducing the (constant) marginal
cost of production of the firm according to the function c : R+ → (0, 1] defined as
c(k) = (1 + k)−ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1).18 As I describe later, a firm can cut its marginal
costs also by learning a technology developed by someone else.
16See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
17I focus on cost-cutting R&D rather than product development to abstract from reverse en-
gineering or intellectual property rights issues (it is diﬃcult for patent-holders to monitor that
competitors do not adopt their cost-cutting tecniques). However, as long as reverse engeneering
is not possible and intellectual property rights are absent, the alternative modelling choice would
lead to similar results.
18Notice that I do not require all the firms to develop the same technology, but I assume that
two technologies developed with the same investment k cut the costs to the same level c(k). Also,
I focus on a particular functional form for c(·) for sake of simplicity. None of the results of the
paper crucially depend on the specific characteristics of this functional form.
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To focus the analysis on the most interesting cases, I assume that the parameters
of the model satisfy the following requirements:
Assumption 1 α and ρ satisfy ρ < 1−αα .
19
Assumption 2 The parameters of the model satisfy Eαρ > n.20
Before carrying out any amount of production, each firm has to perform a fixed
task. A task represents any function that can be outsourced. Examples of tasks can
be the production of intermediate products, assembly, photocopying, typing, etc.
The (fixed) cost of the task, which I will denote by τ , is either equal to t > 0, if the
task is performed in-house, or τ(j) if it is outsourced from contractor j, where τ(j)
is the price posted by contractor j (see below).21
2.2 Contractors
The outsourcing market is populated by a finite setM of identical contractors. Let
m ≥ 2 be the cardinality of the setM. Since contractors specialize in the task, they
can perform it more eﬃciently than the firms. By simplicity, I assume that con-
tractors have zero marginal cost when performing the task for one additional firm.22
Thus, the parameter t measures the eﬃciency of the contractors in performing the
task. Each contractor j ∈M sets a price τ j to perform the task for a client.
As long as firms do not outsource from a contractor, the technology they develop is
known only within their boundaries.23 When a firm hires a contractor, I assume that
19Assumption 1 guarantees that the Second Order Condition of the optimal investment problem
are satisfied.
20Assumption 2 guarantees that, unless they anticipate learning some technology developed by
competitors, firms always invest in equilibrium. To see this, notice that the first order condition
of the optimal investment problem is E(1−α)U
n(1+k(j))
αρ
1−α dj
αρ
1−α (1 + k
∗)
αρ−1+α
1−α −1 = 0. By symmetry, we
get that k∗ > 0 if Eαρ > n.
21Alternative assumptions of the cost of the task t being variable and τ(j) representing a per-unit
price for the task would not change the quality of any of the results of the paper.
22Alternatively, it is possible to assume that contractors have increasing returns of scale in the
measure of firms they serve. This alternative assumption reinforces the main results presented in
this paper and does not significantly alters any of the other results.
23Employees may be loyal for career concerns, because they are given the right incentives, or
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the contractor learns the cost-cutting technology developed by the client perfectly.24
As a contractor can be hired by many firms simultaneously, he may learn diﬀerent
pieces of information.
For simplicity, I make the following assumptions regarding information aggre-
gation: first, I assume that technology knowledge cannot be cumulated, in the
sense that if a contractor learns two cost-cutting technologies c1 and c2 such that
c2 > c1 ≥ 0, the minimum level of costs he can reach with this knowledge is c1.25
Moreover, technologies are assumed to be perfectly divisible, in the sense that if a
contractor knows how to reach the cost level c, he knows how to reach any level of
costs ec ∈ [c, 1].
As a contractor learns the technology adopted by his clients, there are two ways
through which this information diﬀuses to the rest of the market. First, a contractor
who knows some information can sell any portion of it to other firms. Let cj be the
be the best technology developed within the set of the clients of contractor j. Then,
contractor j learns how to cut the marginal cost up to cj. By the perfect divisibility
assumption, contractor j can sell information that allows to cut costs to any level
cj ∈
£
cj, 1
¤
. After performing the task for his clients, a contractor decides the quality
cj and the price ψj of the information he wants to sell.
Second, contractors may not have perfect control on the information they learn.
This lack of control can be caused by several factors, as an imperfect understanding
of the relevance of the technology, imperfect monitoring of the employees, employees’
turnover, etc. For simplicity, I capture this loss of control by assuming that the best
technology learned by contractors (i.e., the technology c ≡ minj∈M cj) spills to a
because they are easily monitorable. See Baccara and Razin (2002 and 2003) and Rajan and
Zingales (2001) for frameworks in which employees can expropriate the information developed
within a firm.
24For a discussion of the implications of relaxing this assumption, see Section 6.
25These assumption could be easily substituted with alternative ways to aggregate information,
e.g. by assuming that by knowing a technology c1 and a worse technology c2 > c1, the contractor
knows how to cut costs up to some ec < c1 (because by knowing the worse technology c2 one can
still improve the better technology c1). This extension goes in the direction of streghtening the
results of the paper.
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fixed subset of measure s of the firms which do not have learned any technology
yet (i.e., they did not invest in technology nor they bought any information from
the contractors).26 The parameter s measures the degree of control that contractors
have on the information they hold. When s = n, contractors always generate a spill
that can reach the entire market. I refer to this situation as a “perfect spill”, and
I analyze it separately in Section 3. When s ∈ (0, n) contractors have some degree
of information control, but they still generate a positive information spill. When
s = 0, there is no spill and contractors have full control over the information they
hold.27 ,28
Remark 1 An important assumption of this model is the fact that firms do not
participate directly to the market for information, i.e. they are not allowed to sell
information directly to their competitors. This assumption and the consequences of
relaxing it are discussed in detail in Section 6.
2.3 The game
2.3.1 Timing of the game
The timing of the game is the following:29
(1) Each firm i simultaneously decides the amount k(i) ∈ R+ to invest in research.
26The modelling assumptions regarding the information spill are discussed in further detail in
Section 6.
27One may wonder why firms investing in technology never generate any information spill, while
contractors do if s > 0. Although it would be possible to introduce in the model a spill generated by
firms as well without changing the quality of the results, this paper focuses on the role of contractors
as information intermediaries. Also, one may argue that a firm that develops a technology is aware
of its importance and is also able to protect it better than a contractor.
28It would be possible to model the spill as an increasing function of the measure of the set of the
firms that either invest or buy the technology, i.e., the more firms know a technology, the highest
the probability that other firms learn it. The choice of modelling the measure of the set of firms
that receive the spill as fixed simplifies the analysis and does not change the quality of the results.
29The game is described here in an informal fashion. See the Appendix for a more formal version
of the game.
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At the same time, each contractor j posts a price for the task τ j ∈ R.30 Let γ the
measure of the set of firms making a positive investment in technology.
(2) All firms simultaneously decide whether to perform the task in-house or to
outsource it from an external contractor. In the last case, a firm also decides which
contractor to outsource the task from.
(3) Contractors perform the task for their clients and they learn the technologies
developed by them. Let cj be the best technology learnt by contractor j.
(4) Every contractor j decides the quality cj ∈
£
cj, 1
¤
and the price ψj of the
information he wants to sell.
(5) Each firm decides whether to buy information from some contractor. Let β
the measure of the set of firms buying information from some contractor.
(6) The best technology learned by contractors “spills” to a measure s ∈ [0, n]
of the firms remaining without a technology. Since the measure of the set of
firms without a technology is n − γ − β, the spill reaches a measure of firm σ ≡
min [s, n− γ − β].
(7) Each firm i adopts the best technology it has learned c (i) and decides how
much to produce by choosing q (i) ∈ R+. The production is sold on the market and
profits are realized.
In this paper I adopt Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as solution
concept, and I focus on pure strategy SPNE.
Remark 2 I refer to the information diﬀusion from some firms to others by means
of the contractors as "information leakage". I also refer to a situation in which some
technology diﬀuses all firms that did not invest in technology as a “perfect leakage”
(i.e. β + σ = n − γ), to a situation in which 0 < β + σ < n − γ as an “imperfect
leakage”and to a situation in which β + σ = 0 as “no leakage”. Observe that a
perfect spill, i.e. s = n (i.e., contractors do not have control over the information)
is a suﬃcient condition to have perfect leakage. In fact, if s = n, then I have
β + σ = n− γ for any γ and β. The analysis of the case s = n is carried out in the
next section.
30In Section 4 I analyze the consequences of restricting the price for the task to be non-negative.
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2.3.2 Payoﬀs
The payoﬀ of a generic firm i ∈ N on the monopolistic competitive market is:
eπ(i) = [p(i)− c (i)] y (i)− k(i)− τ − ψh
where π(i) ≡ [p(i)− c (i)] y (i) is the economic profit, k(i) is the investment in
technology, τ is the cost paid for the task (that could be either equal to t if the
task has been performed in-house or τ j if the task has been outsourced from some
contractor j) and ψh (if any) is the price paid for some technology bought on the
market for information from some contractor h.31
Since the contractors operate at zero marginal cost for the task, the payoﬀ for a
generic contractor is the sum of the revenue generated on the outsourcing market
and the revenue generated on the market for information.32
3 Perfect spill (s = n)
In this Section I analyze the situation in which contractors do not have any control
over the information they learn from their clients that is, the best technology learned
by the contractors always spills to the entire market. This situation corresponds to
the particular case of the model in which s = n. This case fits situations in which,
for instance, the market geographical concentration and the labor mobility are very
high (e.g. Silicon Valley), or the contractors are not sophisticated enough to market
the information they hold (e.g. contractors who provide lower-level tasks).
To start the analysis of the perfect leakage case, observe that if cj is the best
technology learned by contractor j from his clients, each firm on the market has the
choice to adopt the technology c ≡ minj∈M cj at no cost. This implies that there
can be no market for information, as firms know that they are going to receive the
spill and learn the best technology for free.
31Notice that the model allows firms to hire a contractor to perform the task and a diﬀerent one
to buy information from.
32See the Appendix for a formal definition of the contractors’ payoﬀs.
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The following Lemma (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) guarantees that,
if s = n, none of the outsourcing firms can invest in technology in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 If s = n, no outsourcing firm invests in equilibrium.
To understand the intuition of Lemma 1, notice first of all that the competition
among contractors and the absence of a market for information guarantees that the
price charged for the task is always τ j = 0 for all j ∈ M.33 Let us analyze the
(simultaneous) choices of the firms about technology investment and outsourcing.
Since τ j = 0 for all j ∈M, it is obviously the case that if a firm does not invest in
R&D, it always outsources (as there is no cost associated with hiring a contractor).
Suppose that there is a non-empty set of firms outsourcing and another non-empty
set of firms not outsourcing. If one of the outsourcing firms invests in technology, no
other firm in the same set can invest in equilibrium as they anticipate receiving the
leakage with probability 1, and learning the technology for free. This implies that
no more than one firm among the outsourcing ones can invest in equilibrium. Now,
is it possible to have an equilibrium where exactly one outsourcing firm also invests
some positive amount in technology? In this case, since this firm has to pay the
cost of the investment in technology and all the others free-ride on the investment,
this firm has a payoﬀ lower than any other outsourcing firm. On the other hand, in
equilibrium it must be the case that outsourcing and not outsourcing firm have the
same payoﬀs. Thus, the only investing and outsourcing firm would have a profitable
deviation by not outsourcing. This implies that in equilibrium it must be the case
that all the outsourcing firms operate at the maximum cost level, i.e., they do not
invest in technology. This guarantees that, if s = n, research is carried out only in
non outsourcing firms.
The next Proposition (whose proof is also presented in the Appendix) describes
the pure strategies equilibria in the perfect leakage case.
33More precisely, the competition among contractors guarantees τ j ≤ 0 for all j. However, the
absence for a market for information guarantees that no contractor would pay to have the chance
to access some information, so that it has to be τ j = 0 for all j.
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Proposition 2 If s = n, there exist T and T such that T > T and: (i) if T ≤ t
in the unique SPNE all firms always outsource and there is no investment. (ii)
if T < t < T , then there is a unique SPNE in which a positive measure of firms
γn, invest kn > 0 and do not outsource, and a positive measure of firms, n − γn,
outsource and do not invest. (iii) if t ≤ T , there are no pure strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2 guarantees that if s = n, there is never information leakage in equi-
librium. The first part of Proposition 2 states that if the advantage from outsourcing
is high enough (i.e. if t is higher than the upper bound T ), all firms outsource from
contractors and, by Lemma 1, no firm can invest in equilibrium.
The second part of Proposition 2 describes the “no leakage” equilibrium. In this
equilibrium the market splits into two separate segments of firms. The firms in the
first set invest in technology and never outsource, while the ones in the second set
do not invest and outsource. For this equilibrium to exist, the measure of these two
sets of firms has to guarantee the equality of the profits of the firms within each
group. As it is shown in the Appendix, there is a unique measure γn which satisfies
such condition. This equilibrium occurs if t is in between the two boundsT and T .
The condition of t being lower than T rules out the equilibrium in point (a), since
it guarantees that if all firms outsource and do not invest, one firm has a profitable
deviation in investing in technology and performing the task in-house. On the other
hand, t being higher than T guarantees that in the case in which a n-measured
set of firms do not contract and invest, outsourcing and not investing represents a
profitable deviation.
Observe that Proposition 2 guarantees that there is no equilibrium where all firms
invest and do not outsource. This is because, in such candidate equilibrium, one
firm would have a profitable deviation in outsourcing and investing as the leakage
would not hurt its profits.
Proposition 2 suggests that if the outsourcing market is populated by contractors
who, because of labor mobility, low sophistication or geographical concentration
have very scarce control over the information they hold in equilibrium we shouldn’t
observe information leakage. In particular, depending on the eﬃciency level of the
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contractors, we should observe cases in which all firms outsource and the market is
characterized by low R&D investment levels and cases in which the market splits
into a set of low-tech firms that outsource and a high-tech set of firms which do not.
In the analysis of the next Section contractors have more control of the infor-
mation, and we address the question of whether information leakage can occur in
equilibrium and a market for information can eventually arise.
4 Market for Information
From Proposition 2 in the previous Section we know that if s = n, there is never
information leakage in equilibrium and R&D development is carried out only by
firms that do not outsource. The focus of this Section is to explore whether a
market for information can arise when s < n, and, if it can, to study its structure.
If s < n, once contractors learn some technology, it is not necessarily the case that
this technology diﬀuses to the entire market through the spill. This implies that the
information contractors learn may have a market value, and contractors can find
it profitable to sell it to other firms. This is the case in the subgames in which
the parameters n, s and the (endogenous) measure of the set of investing firms, γ,
satisfies γ ∈ [0, n− s) . On the contrary, in the subgames in which γ ∈ [n− s, n] ,
the resulting leakage is perfect, and a market for information cannot arise.
In this Section, I first focus on the subgames in which firms have already made
their investment and outsourcing decisions and only one contractor has learned
some technologies, i.e., the market for information is a monopoly. For those sub-
games, I study the demand for information and the contractors’ optimal pricing of
information. Then, I step back and I solve for the equilibrium of the entire game,
showing that such subgames are the only relevant ones for the equilibrium. The
structure of the equilibria of the game changes as I consider two diﬀerent cases:
s > 0, i.e. contractors do not have perfect control of the information, and s = 0,
i.e. the information spill disappears and the contractors have perfect control of the
information.
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4.1 Monopolistic Market for Information
In this Subsection I focus on the subgames in which all the knowledge leaked from the
firms to the outsourcing market is concentrated in the hands of just one contractor.
This happens when all investing firms hire the same contractor, say j ∈M. The
technology that spills, i.e. the best technology learned by contractors is then the
best technology learned by contractor j from the set of his clients, i.e., c = cj.
4.1.1 Demand for Information
To analyze the market for information, let us start from the demand side. Recall that
the set of investing firms has measure γ. Let us focus now on the set of firms that
did not invest in technology. These firms have two ways to learn some technology:
first, they could decide to buy it. If a firm buys a technology c from contractor j,
this firm will be able to adopt technology c for sure. Second, each firm could decide
not to buy any technology and wait for the information spill, which in this case is
cj. If they do, each firm receive the spill with probability
σ
n−γ−β .
34 This implies that
the willingness to pay a technology c ≤ 1 is φ (c, β) defined as
φ (c, β) = A (c, β)
½
c−
α
1−α −
∙
σ
n− γ − β c
− α
1−α
j +
n− γ − β − σ
n− γ − β
¸¾
where A (c, β) is the value of A as a function of c and β.35 Notice that φ (c, β) can
be positive only if n−γ−β−σ > 0, i.e. a firm faces a positive probability to remain
without any technology if it does not buy technology c. In other words, φ (c, β) can
be positive only if the leakage is not perfect. Also, notice that the demand for
technology is downward sloped in β as it is easy to check that ∂φ(c,β)∂β < 0. Finally,
observe that if σ = 0 the willingness to pay any technology c < 1 is positive for any
β. This means that if the control on the information is perfect and there is no spill,
firms are always willing to pay a positive amount to acquire any technology c < 1.
34Recall that β is the measure of firms buying technology from some contractor. In this case
β = βj .
35See the Appendix for the definition of the function A (k, β).
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4.1.2 The Information Monopolist’s Problem
If γ > n− s, all the firms that did not invest learn technology cj through the spill
with probability 1. If this is the case, they are not willing to buy any technology
from contractor j at any positive price. On the other hand, if γ < n− s, the firms
that did not invest in technology are not sure to receive the spill from the contractor,
and the contractor’s technology has a positive market value. The problem of the
monopolistic contractor j is to choose a level of technology cj ≥ cj to sell and a
price ψj for it (or, equivalently, a measure of firms to sell it to). Formally, given
that selling information has zero cost for the contractor, he has to solve the following
profit maximization problem
max
c∈[cj ,1]
β∈[0,n−γ−s]
βφ (c, β) (1)
Let (c∗, β∗) be a solution for the problem (1). Observe that the monopolistic con-
tractor may have an incentive to limit the“quality” c of the technology sold. In fact,
for a given measure β of information buyers, the better is the technology contractor
j sells (the lower is c), the lower is A (c, β), i.e., the higher is the competition on
the product market. This tends to decrease the willingness to pay the information.
On the other hand, the better is the technology he sells, the lower will be the cost
level of the firms who buy the technology from him, and this tends to increase the
willingness to pay the information. Once the quality of the technology to sell is
fixed, the contractor faces a similar trade-oﬀ in deciding his pricing strategy, i.e.,
in deciding the measure of firms he wants to sell the technology to. Proposition 3
(whose proof is presented in the Appendix) shows that the monopolistic contrac-
tor always chooses to sell the best technology available, i.e. c∗ = cj and, as long as
s > 0, he never sells it to the entire market, i.e. he never generates a perfect leakage.
Proposition 3 The monopolistic contractor’s problem has a unique solution (c∗, β∗)
such that he sells the best technology he learned, i.e. c∗ = c and, if s > 0, the
information leakage he generates is not perfect, i.e. β∗ < n− s− γ.
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The next Corollary states that if a monopolistic contractor has perfect control over
the information, i.e. if s = 0, the information leakage he generates is perfect (i.e.,
β∗ = n−γ). This result is due to the fact that if the control of information is perfect,
a not investing firm’s only way to get a low-cost technology is to buy it from the
contractor. This keeps the demand for information relatively high and guarantees
the fact that the marginal revenue of information of the monopolist remains positive
for any β ∈ [0, n− γ]. The result is that the monopolist sells the information to the
entire market and generates a perfect leakage.
Corollary 4 If s = 0, the information leakage generated by a monopolist for infor-
mation is perfect, i.e. β∗ = n− γ.
4.2 Information Market Structure
In this Section I first discuss the consequences of a competitive market for infor-
mation, and then I derive a result that guarantees monopoly on the market for
information in equilibrium.
4.2.1 Competitive Market for Information
Let us focus now on a subgame in which several contractors learn the same tech-
nology c, and a market for information can arise, i.e. γ < n − s. Then, in such
subgame the market for information is competitive and all contractors post a price
for information c equal to zero (i.e., equal to the marginal cost of information). This
implies that the resulting information leakage is perfect, i.e. β + s = n− γ. To see
this, observe that c is the same technology firms would receive through the spill.
Thus, if β+ s < n− γ, a firm not buying c on the competitive market would not be
sure to learn it through the spill, and would have a profitable deviation in buying
it at zero cost. Thus, a perfect information leakage always occurs. The previous
observation guarantees the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 In the subgames in which more than one contractor learn the same tech-
nology c, a perfect information leakage occurs, i.e., β + s = n− γ.
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4.2.2 Information Market Structure in Equilibrium
In Section 3, Proposition 2 shows that a perfect leakage cannot be an equilibrium
outcome if the leakage is due to a spill. Is it possible to sustain an equilibrium in
which a competitive market for information arises and generates a perfect leakage?
I just argued that if the market for information is competitive, the equilibrium price
for the technology held by contractors is zero. If there are more than two firms
investing and outsourcing from at least two diﬀerent contractors, at least one firm
has a profitable deviation in not investing and waiting for buying such technology at
a zero price. Then, the number of investing and outsourcing firms in such equilibrium
has to be exactly two, and they have to outsource from two diﬀerent contractors.
If this is the case, and s > 0, we know form Proposition 3 that one of these firms
has a profitable deviation in outsourcing from the same contractor of the other, as,
if s > 0, this contractor would generate an imperfect leakage instead of a perfect
one. Proposition 6 (whose proof is presented in the Appendix) formalizes these
considerations, and states that in equilibrium the market for information is never
competitive.
Proposition 6 All the firm that invest in equilibrium outsource from the same con-
tractor. Thus, when a market for information arises in equilibrium, it is always a
monopoly.
Proposition 6 oﬀers an important prediction of this model. Despite the fact that
the original outsourcing market is perfectly competitive, if a market for information
arises in equilibrium, it is always the case that such market is a monopoly.
The result of Proposition 6 has a very general intuition and it is very robust to
diﬀerent specifications of the model.36 Proposition 6 says that information leakage
concerns tend to concentrate the outsourcing market with respect to the structure
it would have otherwise. This is because when a high-tech firm has to choose the
contractor to hire, it will anticipate the impact of its decision on the downstream
market for information. If it hires a contractor that has a critical mass of other
36The robustness of this result to several modifications of the model is discussed in Section 6.4.
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high-tech clients (say, contractor j) rather than a contractor with no or fewer other
high-tech clients (say, contractor h), the high-tech firm accomplishes a double re-
sult. First, the information the firm will bring to contractor j is negligible as the
contractor is already collecting information from all his other clients, while the same
information would be very relevant for contractor h. Second, by hiring contractor
j, the firm preserve a high concentration on the downstream market for informa-
tion. If the firm hired contractor h instead, contractor h would become a stronger
competitor on the market for information for contractor j. As a result, the price for
information would decrease and the information leakage would increase.
In Section 4.4, I identify the conditions under which a monopolistic market for
information is indeed an equilibrium outcome of the game.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
4.3.1 Equilibrium if s > 0
In this Section I analyze the case s ∈ (0, n), i.e. the contractors do not have full
control of the information they hold, but the spill is not perfect.
If s ∈ (0, n), the structure of the equilibria changes as s crosses a cut-oﬀ level s.
In the next result I show that if s is positive but small enough, there is a unique
SPNE in which a market for information arises. Because of Proposition 6, we know
that such a market has to be a monopoly.
Proposition 7 There is s ∈ (0, n) such that if s ∈ (0, s) there is a unique equi-
librium in which a set of measure γmi > 0 of firms invest kmi > 0 in technology,
a set of measure βmi > 0 of firms buy the information, and a set of measure of
firms n− γmi− βmi > s receive the spill or produce at the highest cost level. In this
equilibrium all the investing firms outsource from the same contractor.
Proposition 7 guarantees the existence (and uniqueness) of an equilibrium in which
a market for information arises. In this equilibrium the firms are divided into two
main sets: the firms that invest kmi > 0 in technology and the firms that do not. A
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crucial feature of this equilibrium is that all investing firms outsource the task from
the same contractor. This implies that the market for information is a monopoly.
This, together with Proposition 3, guarantees that an imperfect leakage is generated,
i.e. the information is not going to diﬀuse to the entire market. The set of the
firms that do not invest in technology is divided into three subsets: the firms that
buy technology cmi ≡ (1 + kmi)−ρ from the contractor, the firms that learn the
technology through the spill and the set of firms that remain without any technology.
One of the equilibrium conditions is that firms have to be indiﬀerent between
investing and not investing in technology. If they invest in technology, they bear
the cost of the investment but they are sure to produce at a low cost level. On the
other hand, if they do not invest, they face some uncertainty on the cost level they
will have in production. In particular, with some probability they receive the spill
and are able to carry out production at a low cost level. If they buy the technology
from the contractor, they produce at low costs, but the contractor appropriates the
surplus from a low-cost production. If they neither receive the spill nor buy the
technology, they produce at the highest possible cost level. As it is illustrated in the
Appendix, the indiﬀerence condition between investing and not investing identifies
the equilibrium measure of investing firms, i.e. γmi.
For this equilibrium to exists, the spill s cannot be higher than the upper bound
s. Such upper bound is identified by the condition that, if a zero-measured set of
firms invest in technology, investing in technology represents a positive deviation for
a not investing firm.37
Notice that the equilibrium under consideration does not require contractors to
be very eﬃcient in performing the task, i.e. t does not need to be large for a market
for information to arise. In particular, as all firms in this equilibrium outsource,
the structure of this equilibrium is independent from the parameter t. Thus, even
37It is easy to show that if s ∈ [s, n), two cases are possible. If t ≥ eT , we still have an equilibrium
in which a monopolistic market for information arises as at most one firm invests in technology and
outsources. A second firm cannot invest and outsource since it would have a profitable deviation
in not investing. If t < eT , only no leakage equilibria, similar to the s = n case one, are possible.
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in a market populated by contractors that are not more eﬃcient than in-house
production (i.e., t = 0), one of them can emerge as the monopolist of the market
for information.38
Contractors face a two-stage market. First, they compete on the outsourcing
market, and then, on the market for information. The competition among them
guarantees that no surplus from the contractor market can be appropriated by any
of them. However, there is a potential surplus to be realized on the market for
information, i.e. βmiφ (cmi, βmi). In the equilibrium analyzed in Proposition 7 the
competition among contractors drives the appropriation of that surplus to zero as
well. In fact, the contractor that become the information monopolist anticipates to
appropriate the surplus of the market for information. This implies that contractors
compete to be in that position when they post the price for the task. In other words,
contractors are willing to run a debt in the first stage of the game to appropriate
the surplus in the second stage.
However, contractors may find diﬃcult to get the liquidity necessary to run such
debt in the first stage. As a result, they may face liquidity constraints when trying
to borrow money to compete in the first stage of the game. In our model, a liquidity
constraint for contractors amounts to requiring the price of the task to be non-
negative.
Definition 1 There is a liquidity constraint in the outsourcing market if no con-
tractor can post a negative price for the task, i.e. τ j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..,m}.
If a liquidity constraint is present on the outsourcing market, one contractor
appropriates all the surplus generated on the market for information. In fact, if the
contractors cannot lower the price of the task below zero, all investing firms will
outsource from the same contractor, say j, for τ (j) = 0. This implies that such
38Of course, this is because with the extremely simple information aggregation assumptions we
have, every single firm does not have any impact on the knowledge of the monopolistic contrac-
tor. Still, even in a situation in which every firm’s technology has a (decreasing) impact on the
knowledge of the contractor, we could support a similar equilibrium for an arbitrarily low t.
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contractor appropriates the entire market for information surplus βmiφ (cmi, βmi) .
This result is formalized in Corollary 8.
Corollary 8 If s ∈ (0, s) and there is a liquidity constraint in the outsourcing
market, one contractor appropriates all the market for information surplus, i.e. he
realizes the profit βmiφ (kmi, βmi) .
Corollary 8 guarantees that if a market for information occurs in equilibrium,
not only one contractor among many identical ones becomes the monopolist for the
information, but, if contractors are unable to charge negative prices for the task, he
appropriates the entire surplus generated by the market for information.
4.3.2 Equilibrium if s = 0
In Corollary 4 I already started to study the case in which contractors have a perfect
control over information, i.e. s = 0. In this case there is no information spill and
all the firms that neither invest in technology nor buy the information from the
contractor always produce at the maximum cost level. Corollary 4 states that if
s = 0, the not-investing firms are always willing to pay a positive amount to get the
information from a contractor. This keep the demand for information high enough
to guarantee that a monopolistic contractor always prefer to exhaust the market
selling to all his potential customers. This implies that if s = 0, a monopolistic
contractor generates a perfect leakage. In Proposition 9, I analyze the implications
of perfect information control on the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 9 If s = 0 there is a unique equilibrium in which all firms outsource
and invest k0 ≥ 0 in technology. No firm buys information from a contractor.
Proposition 9 guarantees that if s = 0, then no market for information arises, as
firms always prefer to invest themselves rather than buying the information from
the contractor. This is due to the fact that the optimal investment problem that
investing firms solve when deciding how much to invest guarantees that the total
return on the optimal investment is strictly positive. This implies that no firm can
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find optimal to buy the information from the contractor (who in the transaction
extracts all the surplus generated by the technology), rather than to invest at the
beginning of the game. Proposition 9 suggests that when information sellers have
perfect control over the information they sell, they face a hold-up problem gener-
ated by the lack of commitment power. As contractors cannot commit to sell the
information at a low price, all the firms find optimal to develop their own technology
rather than rely on the market for information.
5 Comparative statics
In Sections 3 and 4, I analyzed the equilibria arising as s varies in the interval [0, n].
Recall that the parameter smeasures the amount of control a contractor has over the
information he learns from his clients. In a situation in which s = n a contractor
cannot become an information seller. This may happen for several reasons. Not
having the resources or the expertise to sell technology, and not being aware of the
information held by the employees (and consequently not taking measures to protect
and control it) are the two main ones. A contractor can become an information seller
only when he becomes aware of the information he holds, he protects and controls
it to some extent and he has the ability to market and sell it to other firms. In our
model this corresponds to a situation in which s is small enough. When contractors
reach full control of the information they hold, we are in a situation in which s = 0.
It is interesting to analyze the change of the level of technology developed by the
investing firms and the change of the diﬀusion of such technology in the market as
the parameter s varies from n to 0, i.e. as contractors have more and more control
over the information they hold.
When contractors have no control over the information they hold, i.e. when
s = n, Proposition 2 shows that there exists a not-empty interval
£
T , T
¤
such that
if t ∈
£
T , T
¤
there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium where a positive measure
of firms invest and do not outsource. Recall that we named as kn and γn the (max-
imum) investment level in such equilibrium and the measure of firms that carry it
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out, respectively. Recall also that in such equilibrium there is no information leak-
age. This implies that only the firms that invest have a low-cost technology.39 When
s ∈ (0, s) , I showed that a perfect leakage never occurs in equilibrium, and there is
an equilibrium in which a market for information arises. Recall that kmi, γmi and
βmi are the investment carried out by the investing firms in such equilibrium, the
measure of firms that carry it out and the measure of firms that buy the technol-
ogy, respectively. Notice that the total measure of firms adopting the technology
developed by the investment kmi in such equilibrium is γmi+βmi+ s. Finally, when
s = 0, I showed that in the unique equilibrium all firms invest k0 in R&D (using a
notation consistent with the other cases, let γ0 = n). Proposition 10 compares the
maximum investment levels and the measure of the diﬀusion that the technologies
reach as the parameter s varies.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium maximum investment levels are such that kn >
kmi > k0. The measures of firms adopting such technologies are such that γn <
γmi + βmi + s < γ0 = n.
Proposition 10 describes the eﬀect of an increased sophistication of contractors as
information sellers on the technology maximum level and diﬀusion in the market.
When contractors do not have any control on the information they hold the level of
technology reached in equilibrium is the maximum one. However, such information
is adopted by the minimal possible measure of firms. The possibility of contractors
becoming information sellers depresses the maximum level of technology, but in-
creases the size of the set of firms that adopt such technology. Finally, if contractors
have full control on the information, the level of technology is the minimal possible
and everybody adopts it.
The last result allows to analyze the ineﬃciency due to duplication of invest-
ment. Duplication occurs when we have many firms investing resources to develop
39When t > T , we showed that there is a unique equilibrium in which all firms outsource and no
firm invests. This implies that kn is the highest R&D investment in any pure strategy equilibrium
for s = n.
27
technologies that are equivalent to each other. In the absence of an information
leakage problem, all firms would outsource and invest in R&D, so that there is a
high level of overinvestment. One may wonder whether the presence of contractors
acting as information intermediaries allows information to diﬀuse and mitigates this
ineﬃciency. Our results predict that when contractors do not have full control of
the information, duplication is indeed mitigated. In particular, we have that γmi is
smaller than n. However, when s = 0, a market for information cannot arise, and
the ineﬃciency due to duplication reappears as all firms invest in R&D to develop
their own technologies.
6 Discussion and further research
6.1 Information sellers
An important feature of the model presented in Section 2 is the fact that firms cannot
participate directly in the market for the information by selling their technology to
competitors. This assumption allows to simplify the analysis of the game and to
focus on the role of contractors as information sellers. However, if one considers a
market for information populated both by contractors and firms, the contractors are
the ones likely to prevail because information buyers may consider the reliability of
information sold by contractors higher than the one sold by their own competitors.
This is because firms may have incentives to distort the information to damage
their competitors on the product market (and thus, via monopolistic competition,
to increase their own demand). On the other hand, contractors do not participate in
the competition on the product market, and they do not have incentives to distort
the information they sell. Thus, in order to sell information to a rival, a firm may
have to incur an extra cost to certify the information and convince the buyers to
sell it. The presence of such cost, even if very small, has the eﬀect of wiping the
firms out of the market for information.
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6.2 Information spill
A second feature of the model worthwhile discussing here is the presence and the
features of the information spill. Here, I first discuss the presence of the information
spill in the model, and then I discuss its features in the modelling choices made in
Section 2.
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the presence of a positive information spill guaran-
tees that in equilibrium not all the firms invest in R&D. One may argue that this
is the consequence of the way in which R&D investment is modeled in this paper.
If we modeled R&D as a fixed investment rather than a continuous choice variable
of the firms, one may conjecture equilibria in which, even if s = 0, a market for
information arises. Unfortunately, this conjecture turns out to be not true. To
see this, consider a model in which a fixed investment k is required to develop a
R&D technology, and s = 0. Suppose that if no other firm on the market has such
technology, it is worthwhile for a firm to incur the cost of developing it, but if too
many firms on the market have it, then the return on such R&D will be too small
to justify the cost of developing it. Let the price for information be φ. Notice that
if φ < k, in equilibrium at most one firm can develop R&D, as a second one would
have a profitable deviation by buying it later on the market for information. Then,
this firm anticipates the contractor selling the information to a certain measure of
competitors. However, it is easy to check from the monopolist profit maximization
problem (1) that, if s = 0, the contractor always generates a perfect leakage, i.e.
β = n. Then, the firm that develops technology is completely expropriated of it,
and it has a profitable deviation in non developing it. If φ > k, every firm buying
technology form the contractor would have a profitable technology by developing
it by itself. Suppose finally that φ = k. This is possible only if the willingness to
pay φ
¡
k, n
¢
(since n is the solution of the monopolist maximization problem (1))
happens to coincide with k. This can be true at most for a zero-measured set of
parameters of the model. Then, we can conclude that generically there are no pure
strategy equilibria in this version of the model.
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As it is apparent from the description of the timing of the game, an important
assumption of this model is the fact that firms have to decide whether to invest in
technology and whether to buy technology before knowing whether they receive the
information spill. This is because the information spill is a phenomenon that should
be interpreted as taking place in the long-run: as contractors experience labor turn-
over, the technologies start diﬀusing through the market and more and more firms
start adopting it.
Finally, let us discuss the assumption that the spill can be received only by firms
that neither invest in technology nor bought information from contractors. This
assumption is made to guarantee that, in a market in which all the firms but a zero-
measured set are adopting a certain technology, the firms that are not adopting it
will learn it through the spill with probability one, and are thus willing to pay zero
to buy it from a contractor. This fact guarantees that, as it is reasonable to expect
from a monopolist, the contractor will not sell the information to all firms. It is
easy to guess that this result could have been achieved with diﬀerent assumptions
about the spill (for instance, any firm receives some spill with a probability that
is increasing in the measure of firm already adopting some technology, with this
probability going to 1 as the measure tends to n), and the specific assumption made
in Section 2 does not aﬀect the results in any significant way.
6.3 Monopolistic Competition
The choice of using a monopolistic competitive model in this paper is motivated by
its tractability and the fact that it allows us to focus on the strategic concerns of
the firms in generating information leakage while abstracting from all the others.
However, the main results of this paper do not depend on this modeling choice
and can be easily replicated in a diﬀerent competitive environment in which at
least four firms produce diﬀerentiated yet substitute products.40 The drawback of
40We need 2 firms to hire the same contractor as an illustration of the monopolistic outcome on
the market for information, and 2 other firms that do not invest in R&D to have the possibility to
diﬀerentiate a perfect leakage from an imperfect one.
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a monopolistic competitive environment is the fact that, as it was seen in Section
4, a monopolistic seller of information generates a perfect leakage if s = 0. This is
because, when s = 0, the marginal revenue of information is positive and constant.
As the marginal cost is zero, the monopolistic problem always has a corner solution
in β∗ = n− γ. Then, an alternative competitive environment, together with a fixed
investment level k, is likely to generalize our result to the case s = 0 as well.
6.4 Robustness of Proposition 6
There are three basic observations that underlie the result of Proposition 6. First,
as we showed in Proposition 3, a monopolistic market for information generates a
more limited leakage than a competitive market for information. Second, in equilib-
rium there cannot be more than two high-tech firms outsourcing from two diﬀerent
contractors as otherwise one of these firms would have a profitable deviation in not
investing in R&D and waiting to buy the information on the competitive market for
information (where, as the marginal cost of selling information is zero, the equilib-
rium price is going to be zero as well). Finally, there cannot be exactly two firms
investing in R&D and outsourcing from two diﬀerent contractors as one of these
firms would have a profitable deviation in selecting the same contractor of the other
and generating a more limited information leakage instead of a perfect one.
Here I discuss the robustness of these three points to alternative specifications of
the model and of the competition module adopted in the paper. The first observa-
tion is obviously very general as it relies on the fact that as the degree of competition
on a market increases, the quantity traded increases as well. The second and third
observations rely on the fact that contractors compete on price on the market for
information. Thus, the only situation in which a firm is pivotal for the market struc-
ture of the market for information, is the situation in which exactly two high-tech
firms are outsourcing from two contractors. Thus, as in competition the equilibrium
price of the information is zero, a firm that is not pivotal for the competition on the
market for information strictly prefers to buy the information on the market rather
than investing. On the other hand, a firm that is pivotal for the competition on the
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market for information prefers to decrease the degree of competition by outsourcing
from a contractor that already holds information.
Although with alternative modules of competition on the market for information
the distinction between a pivotal and a non-pivotal firm may become more blurred,
the basic intuition of this result is still very strong. Suppose that, once they hold
some information, the contractors compete on quantities on the market for infor-
mation (thus, it is not necessarily the case that the price for information on the
competitive market is zero). In particular, suppose that a number 2 ≤ h ≤ m of
contractors hold some technology c (k) . Let p(k, h) > 0 be the price on the market
for information if h contractors compete to sell technology c (k) . Suppose that one
of these contractors has at least 2 clients that developed technology c (k) . Thus,
one of these clients is non-pivotal to the structure of the downstream market for
information. Observe that this firm would be better oﬀ by buying the information
on the market, as in equilibrium it must be the case that p(k, h) < k.41 Then, it
must be the case that exactly h firms are investing in R&D and hire each one of
the h contractors. In particular, consider one of these h firms and observe that this
firm would have a profitable deviation in hiring a contractor that another firm is
already using as we have p(k, h − 1) > p(k, h) (the equilibrium price is decreasing
in the number of competitors on the market).42
Thus, we can still conclude that the firms that invest in R&D have an incentive
to distort the downstream market for information by making it as concentrated as
possible.
41Notice that it is not possible to sustain an equilibrium in which p(k, h) > k and firms buy
information from contractors as firms would have a profitable deviation in investing themselves k
rather than paying p(k, h) on the market for information. So, to sustain an equilibrium with a
market for information it has to be the case that p(k, h) < k.
42Recall that in equilibrium all the contractors must post the same price for the task. Also,
notice that here the presence of information leakage acts exactly as an entry barrier on the market
for information.
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6.5 Further research
The most natural follow-up to this analysis is to explore the welfare implications of
the role of contractors as information intermediaries. The socially optimal outcome
of the model is a situation in which there is no duplication of investment (i.e. only
one firm invest in technology), and both the investment level and the set of firms
that adopt the corresponding technology maximize social welfare.
In this model I assumed that a contractor working for a firm always perfectly learns
the technology developed by the client. This is obviously a strong assumption, and it
is due to the fact that the focus in this paper is to understand the implications of the
ability of the contractors (captured by the parameter s) as information sellers, and
not the access they happen to have to the technologies of their clients. An alternative
version of this model is a situation in which a contractor hired by a firm learns
the technology with some probability α ∈ (0, 1). The parameter α captures the
degree to which cost-cutting technology may be transferred or copied, and it varies
across industries. One can show that is contractors have no information control
(i.e., s = n), in equilibrium an interesting phenomenon arises: a finite number
of outsourcing firms develop R&D technology. It is interesting to note that, in the
early 90s, Sun Microsystems was outsourcing most of its production; however, it was
still able to innovate and compete eﬀectively, both with workstation manufacturers
who, by and large, were not outsourcing but were also investing in R&D (e.g. HP),
and with “second-tier” firms who did not invest in R&D and relied on outside
contractors. The proposed extension of the model seems to capture this situation
quite well. By making the parameter α vary, one can derive testable predictions
about the structure of industries which diﬀer in the possibility to replicate cost-
cutting technology. Also, one may try to predict which of these industries are likely
to display a higher reliance on outsourcing in general and management consultants
in particular.43
43See Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2004) for some recent empirical research on the link between
outsourcing and innovation.
33
7 Appendix
7.1 The game
7.1.1 Timing
Let us repeat the timing of the game to introduce some useful notation:
(1) All firms i ∈ N simultaneously decide how much to invest in research by paying
k (i) ∈ R+. Simultaneously, each contractor j ∈M posts a price for the task τ j ∈ R.
Let us denote by γ the measure of the set of firms investing in technology, i.e. the set
K ≡ {i | k (i) > 0}
(2) All firms i ∈ N simultaneously decide whether to perform the task in-house or
to outsource it from an external contractor. In the last case, a firm also decides which
contractor to outsource the task from. Let us denote by Hj the set of firms outsourcing
from contractor j, and H ≡
[
j∈M
Hj.
(2) Contractors perform the task for their clients and they learn the technologies
developed by the clients. Let cj be the best technology learned by contractor j, i.e.
cj ≡ inf{i|i∈Hj} c (k(i)).
(3) Every contractor j decides how much information to sell, i.e. he chooses a technology
level cj ∈
£
cj, 1
¤
and post a price ψj for it.
(4) Each firm decides whether to buy technology cj from contractor j.Let us denote by
Bj the set of all firms that buy a technology from contractor j, let B ≡
[
j∈M
Bj and let
βj and β be the measure of the sets Bj and B, respectively.
(5) The maximum level of technology learned by contractors (i.e., the technology c ≡
minj∈M cj) spills to a measure σ = min [s, n− γ − β] of firms. Each firm in the set
N\ (K ∪B) receive the spill with probability σn−γ−β .
(6) Each firm i ∈ N adopts the best technology it has learned c (i) and decides how
much to produce by choosing q (i) ∈ R+. The production is sold on the market and
profits are realized.
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7.1.2 Payoﬀs
The payoﬀ of a generic firm i ∈ N on the monopolistic competitive market is:
eπ(i) = [p(i)− c (i)] y (i)−k(i)− τ−X
h∈M
ψh1{i∈Bh}
where [p(i)− c (i)] y (i) is the economic profit, k(i) is the investment in R&D, τ is the
cost paid for the task and ψh (if any) is the price paid for some technology bought on
the market for information.44 From the model presented in Section 2, one can derive the
profit function of firm i as a function of the technology level of its competitors, i.e.
eπ(i) = E (1− α)R
N c(j)
−α
1−αdj
c(i)
−α
1−α−k(i)− τ−
X
h∈M
ψh1{i∈Bh} (2)
The payoﬀ for a generic contractor j ∈M is
π(j) = µjτ j+βjψj
where µj is the measure of firms outsourcing from contractor j, µjτ j is the revenue gen-
erated on the outsourcing market, βj is the measure of the set of firms buying information
from contractor j, and βjψj is the revenue generated on the market for information.
7.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: From (2), denoting by π(i) the economic profit of a firm, we have
π(i) =
E (1− α)R
N c(j)
−α
1−αdj
c(i)
−α
1−α
=
E (1− α)R
N (1 + k(j))
αρ
1−α dj
(1 + k(i))
αρ
1−α
From now on, let
A ≡ E (1− α)R
N (1 + k(j))
αρ
1−α dj
44I denote by 1E the indicator variable equal to 1 is the event E occurs and zero other-
whise.
35
Consider first the case in which the set of outsourcing firms, H, includes at least two
firms, and the set of non-outsourcing firms, N\H is non-empty. Notice that in the set
H there can be at most one firm investing in technology. Indeed, a second firm would
have a profitable deviation in not investing and learning the technology through the spill.
Now, is it possible to have an equilibrium with exactly one investing and outsourcing firm?
Suppose it is, and let kH > 0 be the investment of such firm, say firm i. Notice that that
each not-investing firm in H must be at least as well oﬀ as each firm in N\H, since if this
is not the case, that firm would be better oﬀ following the strategy of the firm in N\H
(notice that these firms’ behavior does not have any significant influence on A). Notice
also that each firm in N\H must be at least as well oﬀ as any non-investing firm in H,
since if the opposite is true, it would have a profitable deviation in outsourcing and not
investing. If only one firm i in H invests kH > 0, i has to be worse oﬀ than the others
firms inH, which we just claimed are at least as well oﬀ as the not outsourcing firms. Firm
i is then worse oﬀ than the ones not outsourcing, so it would have a profitable deviation
by following their strategy. Indeed, if we denote by kN\H the optimal investment of the
not-outsourcing firms, we have
AL (1 + kH)
αρ
1−α − kH < AL (1 + kH)
αρ
1−α
= AL
¡
1 + kN\H
¢ αρ
1−α − kN\H − t
< ANL
¡
1 + kN\H
¢ αρ
1−α − kN\H − t
where γ is the measure of the set of investing firms, AL is defined as
AL≡
E (1− α)
(n− γ) (1 + kH)
αρ
1−α + γ
¡
1 + kN\H
¢ αρ
1−α
and ANL as
ANL≡
E (1− α)
n+ γ
¡
1 + kN\H
¢ αρ
1−α
> AL
By avoiding the leakage, and then increasing the demand for all firms (higher A), firm
i would improve everybody’s profits in the set N\H, and a fortiori, it would be better oﬀ
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than by outsourcing and investing kH .
In the case in which there is only one outsourcing firm, if this firm invests, the investment
has to be at the same level of all other non-outsourcing firms (as they solve the same
maximization problem). Then, one non-outsourcing (and investing) firm has a profitable
deviation in outsourcing and not investing. Finally, if all firms outsource, at most one
firm can invest in equilibrium kH (as all the others would free-ride on that investment).
However, this implies
E (1− α)
n (1 + kH)
αρ
1−α
(1 + kH)
αρ
1−α − kH <
E (1− α)
n
i.e., the investing firm is completely expropriated from its investment (i.e., its economic
profit is the same it would get without investment). Thus, the firm has a profitable
deviation in not investing
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) The profit of a not-outsourcing firm is
π (i) = A (1 + k (i))
αρ
1−α − k (i)− t
The first order condition of the optimal investment problem is
A
αρ
1− α (1 + k (i))
αρ−1+α
1−α − 1 = 0 (3)
which is such that dk(i)dA > 0. By Lemma 1, if everybody else outsource, A is the
maximum possible, i.e. A = E(1−α)n , which implies that k ≡
³
n
Eαρ
´ 1−α
αρ−1+α − 1 is the
maximum possible investment. If
E
n
(1− α)
¡
1 + k
¢ αρ
1−α − k − t ≤ E
n
(1− α)
or
t ≥
µ
n
Eαρ
¶ 1−α
αρ−1+α
µ
1− α
αρ
− 1
¶
− E
n
(1− α) + 1 ≡ T
then the firms strictly prefers outsourcing and not investing rather than not outsourcing
and investing. Since the profit of a not outsourcing firm is increasing in A, if the maximum
possible A does not refrain a firm to contract, any lower A, corresponding to diﬀerent
37
strategies chosen by the other firms do not refrain such firm to contract either, so that
the equilibrium is unique.
(ii) Let t < T . Recall from (i) that in this case, if all (or all but a zero-measured set
of) the firms outsource, there is a profitable deviation in not outsourcing and investing k.
Then, in equilibrium it must be the case that a positive measured set of firms invest and
do not outsource (i.e., γ < n). On the other hand, notice that for any A there is a unique
level of k (i) which satisfies (3), and since all the not-outsourcing firms face the same A,
they must invest the same in R&D. This implies that in equilibrium a positive measured
set of firms outsources (γ > 0). In fact, if γ = 0, they would all invest the same k in
R&D. In this case, one non-outsourcing firm would be better oﬀ outsourcing because it
would gain t and the leakage cannot lower its profit (not having any impact on A). This
implies that in the only possible equilibrium left there must be some positive measure
γ ∈ (0, n) of firms not outsourcing and a positive measure n − γ of outsourcing firms.
By Lemma 1, we have that there is no i ∈ H such that c (i) < c = 1, so in equilibrium
it must be the case that c (i) = c = 1 for all i ∈ H.
The considerations made so far allow us to write A as a function of the measure of
investing firms, γ, i.e.,
A (γ) ≡ E(1− α)
(n− γ) +
R
N/H c (k
∗(j))−
α
1−α dj
=
E (1− α)
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k−i)
αρ
1−α
where the fact that, by symmetry, all the not-outsourcing firm invest the same amount
in R&D guarantees the second equality. Then, for a given γ to find the equilibrium k (i)
for i ∈ N/H, we need to find the solution k−i = k (i) of
E (1− α)
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k−i)
αρ
1−α
(1 + k (i))
αρ−1+α
1−α
µ
αρ
1− α
¶
−1 = 0
or
Eαρ
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k−i)
αρ
1−α
(1 + k (i))
αρ−1+α
1−α −1 = 0
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Such solution k−i = k (i) = k∗(γ) is unique for each γ since
dk (i)
dk−i
= −
∂A
∂k(γ)c (k (i))
− 1
1−α
¡
− α
1−α
¢
c0 (k (i))
d2π(i)
dk(i)2
< 0
Now, the equilibrium condition that outsourcing and not outsourcing firms must have
the same payoﬀ allow us to determine the equilibrium measure γ. Recall that if we denote
by πH (γ) the profit of an outsourcing firm, we have
πH (γ)= A (γ)=
E (1− α)
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α
On the other hand, if πN\H (γ) denotes the profit of a not-outsourcing firm, we have
πN\H (γ) = A (γ) (1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − k∗(γ)− t
=
E (1− α)
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − k∗(γ)− t
The equilibrium γ is a solution of the equation πH (γ) = πN\H (γ). For γ = 0, we
have that, as t ≤ T , πH (0) < πN\H (0). On the other hand, notice that for γ = n, we
have k∗(γ) = Eαρn − 1, and A (n) = (1− α)
¡
E
n
¢−αρ+1−α
1−α (αρ)−
αρ
1−α . This implies
πH (n)= (1− α)
µ
E
n
¶−αρ+1−α
1−α
(αρ)−
αρ
1−α
and
πN\H (n)= (1− α)
µ
E
n
¶−αρ+1−α
1−α
(αρ)−
αρ
1−α
µ
Eαρ
n
¶ αρ
1−α
−Eαρ
n
+1− t
This implies that πH (n) ≥ πN\H (n) if and only if
t ≥E
n
"
1− α− αρ−
µ
Eαρ
n
¶− αρ
1−α
(1− α)
#
+1 ≡T
Let us now show that there is a unique γ∗ satisfying the condition πH (γ) = πN\H (γ),
and thus there is a unique equilibrium for t ∈
£
T , T
¤
. The proof of uniqueness consists
of two steps: (a) I first show that ∂A(γ)∂γ < 0 for all γ, (b) then I show that
∂A(γ)
∂γ < 0 for
all γ implies uniqueness.
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(a) To show that ∂A(γ)∂γ < 0 for all γ, let us first compute the derivative
∂k∗(γ)
∂γ . Recall
that from (3), we have
Eαρ
(n− γ) + γ (1 + k∗)
αρ
1−α
(1 + k∗)
αρ−1+α
1−α −1 = 0
which implies
∂k∗(γ)
∂γ
=
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
i
αρ−1+α
(1−α)(1+k∗(γ))
n
n+ γ
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
io
− αργ
1−α (1 + k
∗(γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α
(4)
Now, we have that
∂A (γ)
∂γ
= −E (1− α)
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ γαρ
1−α (1 + k
∗(γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α ∂k
∗(γ)
∂γh
n+ γ
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
ii2
which implies that ∂A(γ)∂γ < 0 if and only if
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
i
+
γαρ
1− α (1 + k
∗(γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α
∂k∗(γ)
∂γ
> 0 (5)
By plugging (4) into (5) and after some manipulations, one can see that condition (5)
reduces to
γαρ
1− α (1 + k
∗(γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α <
γαρ
1− α (1 + k
∗(γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α
+
1− α− αρ
1− α
h
n+ γ
h
(1 + k∗(γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
ii
which is satisfied because, by Assumption 1, we have 1−α−αρ
1−α > 0.
(b) Since ∂A(γ)∂γ < 0, and t ∈
£
T , T
¤
, there is a unique SP equilibrium in which n− γ
firms contract and do not invest and γ firms do not contract and invest. To see this, notice
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that for any γ it must be
∂πN\H (γ)
∂γ
=
∂A (γ)
∂γ
(1 + k (γ))
αρ
1−α +
+
∙
A (1 + k (γ))
αρ−1+α
1−α
αρ
1− α − 1
¸
∂k (γ)
∂γ
=
∂A (γ)
∂γ
(1 + k (γ))
αρ
1−α
<
∂πH (γ)
∂γ
< 0
Since πH (n) < πN\H (n), there must be a unique γ ∈ [0, n] such that πH (γ) =
πN\H (γ).
The last thing left to show is that T < T . To see that, recall that A (n) < A (0) and
notice that
αρ
1− αA (n) (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α −k < αρ
1− αA (0) (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α −k (6)
for any k ∈ R+. Equation (6), since k (n) < k (0), implies
T = A (n) (1 + k (n))
αρ
1−α −k (n)−A (n)
=
Z k(n)
0
µ
αρ
1− αA (n) (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α − k
¶
dk
<
Z k(0)
0
µ
αρ
1− αA (0) (1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α − k
¶
dk
= A (0) (1 + k (0))
αρ
1−α −k (0)−A (0)=T
From the analysis carried out so far, it follow also that, if t < T , we have no pure
strategies equilibria
Proof of Proposition 3: If only one firm invests in R&D and this firm outsources, it
is obviously the case that the market for information is a monopoly. Consider then the case
in which more than one firm invest in R&D. Notice that, by symmetry, all the investing
firms in equilibrium must invest the same amount. This implies that none of them in
equilibrium changes the knowledge of the contractor. This implies that in equilibrium
they must all outsource, and c is their technology. To show the first part of the claim we
need to show that c∗ = c. The demand for technology is given by
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φ (c, β) = A (c, β)
½
c−
α
1−α −
∙
σ
n− γ − β c
− α
1−α +
n− γ − β − σ
n− γ − β
¸¾
wherec is the technology spilling from the monopolistic contractor to a measure σ of
firms and
A (c, β)=
E (1− α)
(γ + σ) c
−α
1−α + βc
−α
1−α + (n− γ − σ − β)
Notice that the monopolist of information, contractor j, has to solve the problem (1).
For a given β ∈ [0, n− γ − σ] , observe that the problem becomes
max
c≥c
n
c
−α
1−α −
h
σ
n−γ−β c
−α
1−α + n−γ−β−σn−γ−β
io
(γ + σ) c
−α
1−α + βc
−α
1−α + (n− γ − σ − β)
The derivative of the objective function is
¡ −α
1−α
¢
c
−1
1−α
h³
γ + σ + σβn−γ−β
´
c
−α
1−α + (n−γ)(n−γ−σ−β)n−γ−β
i
h
(γ + σ) c
−α
1−α + βc
−α
1−α + (n− γ − σ − β)
i2 < 0
As the derivative is always negative, we have c∗ = c.
To prove the second part of the claim, observe that, if c∗ = c for any given β, we have
φ (β) = A (c, β)
n− γ − β − σ
n− γ − β
n
c
−α
1−α − 1
o
where
A (c, β)=
E (1− α)
(γ + σ + β) c
−α
1−α + (n− γ − σ − β)
However, since
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
is a constant at the time the monopolist solves the profit
maximization problem, the problem (1) is equivalent to
max
β∈[0,n−γ−s]
β n−γ−β−sn−γ−β
(γ + s+ β)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
+ n
(7)
It is easy to check that the second order condition of problem (7) is satisfied. Let
us define Φ (β) ≡ φ0 (β)β + φ (β). As the second order conditions of (7) is satisfied,
42
Φ0 (β) < 0. Then, the monopolist chooses β∗ such that Φ (β∗) = 0. As from the definition
of φ (β) it is easy to check that φ (n− γ − s) = 0, we have that Φ (n− γ − s) < 0, thus
β∗ < n− γ − s
Proof of Corollary 4: If s = 0, since we still have that by Proposition 3 we have
that c∗ = c, the demand for information becomes
ϕ (β)=
E (1− α)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
(γ + β)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
+ n
The monopolist has to maximize the revenue ϕ (β)β. However, notice that ϕ0 (β)β +
ϕ (β) > 0 for any β. In fact, ϕ0 (β)β + ϕ (β) > 0 if
−
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
β
(γ + β)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
+ n
+1 > 0
which is equivalent to
β <
(γ + β)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
+ nh
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
which is always satisfied. This guarantees that β∗ = n− γ
Proof of Proposition 6: First of all, notice that the competition on the contractor
market guarantees τ j = τh for all j, h ∈M.
Suppose there is a SPNE in which there is a competitive market for information. This
implies that there are at least two investing firms that outsource from two diﬀerent con-
tractors. If the firms are more than two, there is at least one firm that would have a
profitable deviation in not investing and buying the technology at zero price. This implies
that there can only be exactly two investing firms outsourcing from two diﬀerent contrac-
tors. However, by Proposition 3, if s > 0, one of these two firms would have a profitable
deviation hiring the same contractor of the other firm, as this would produce an imperfect
leakage instead of a perfect one. To conclude the proof, it remains to show that we cannot
have a competitive market for equilibrium with s = 0. To see this, observe that if there
are more than two firms investing and outsourcing from diﬀerent contractors, one would
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have a profitable deviation in waiting to buy the information for free. Then, there must
be at most two firms investing and outsourcing from two diﬀerent contractors, say A and
B. The price of the task in this situation has to be the same for both firms, say eτ . Let
S be the surplus on the market for information that a monopolist would appropriate. Ifeτ> −S, contractor A would have a profitable deviation in lowering the price of the task
to eτ − ε to attract the client of contractor B, become the information monopolist and
appropriate S later. If eτ = −S, then one of the two contractor would have a profitable
deviation in raising the price of the task (or equivalently, drop out of the market), as he
is not going to appropriate S, and he is oﬀering the task at a negative price¥
Proof of Proposition 7:
First step: Let us show that if in equilibrium there are more than one firm that
outsource and invest in R&D, then all firms outsource. To see this by contradiction,
suppose that more than one firm contract and invest, and someone does not outsource.
From Proposition 6 we know that all the investing firms must outsource from the same
contractor, say j. Since all the outsourcing and investing firms face the same decision
problem, in equilibrium they have to invest the same. This implies that none of the the
outsourcing firms is adding any information to the level of knowledge of contractor j.
Thus, the outsourcing and the not outsourcing firm face the same problem when deciding
how much to invest.
Since τ is a constant, we have that all the firms invest the same. This implies that
the non outsourcing firms would be better oﬀ outsourcing, since, with other firms already
outsourcing and investing, they would not aﬀect the information learned by the contractor,
and then the quality and size of the leakage.
Second step: We have to build an equilibrium in which γmi firms invest and outsource
from the same contractor, βmi firms buy the technology from this contractor and s <
n − γmi − βmi firms receive the spill. First of all, notice that the competition on the
contractor market guarantees τ j = τh for all j, h ∈ M. If a set of measure γmi of
firms invest and outsource from a contractor, observe that an investing firm is better
oﬀ hiring the same contractor (this is because, from Proposition 3 we know that if the
market for information is a monopoly the leakage is not perfect, while competitive market
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for information would produce a prefect leakage). For this equilibrium to exist, three
conditions need to be satisfied. First, it must be the case that the firms that invest
have the same expected profit of the firms that do not invest. Second, the equilibrium
investment kmi has to be the optimum one for the investing firms and finally the price
for information and the measure of firms buying information (βmi) have to be the profit
maximizing ones for the monopolist of information, say contractor j. Given γ, from the
information monopolist’s problem, from Proposition 3 and from the optimal investment
problem we know that c∗ (γ) ≡ (1 + k∗ (γ))−ρ and β∗ (γ) ∈ (0, n− s− γ) satisfy
β∗= argmax
β∈[0,n−s−γ]
β n−γ−β−sn−γ−β
(γ + s+ β)
h
(1 + k∗)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ n
(where we know from Proposition 3 that β∗ < n− s− γ) and
Eαρ (1 + k∗)
αρ−1+α
1−α
(γ + s+ β∗)
h
(1 + k∗)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ n
−1 = 0
Now, we need to find γ such that the expected profits of the investing firms, i.e. πI is
the same as the one of the not-investing firms, i.e. πN\I . For this to be true, γ has to
satisfy
πI (γ) = A (γ) (1 + k∗ (γ))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (γ)= (8)
= A (γ)
½
1 +
s
n− β∗ (γ)− γ
h
(1 + k∗ (γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
i¾
= πN\I (γ)
where
A (γ)=
E (1− α)
n+ (γ + σ + β∗ (γ))
h
(1 + k∗ (γ))
αρ
1−α − 1
i
Notice that if γ = n − s, we have that β∗ (n− s) = 0. On the other hand, we have
that k∗ (n− s) > 0. In fact, the optimal investment k in this case satisfies
Eαρ
n (1 + k)
αρ
1−α
(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α −1 = 0
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Then, we have k∗ (n− s) = Eαρn − 1 > 0 by Assumption 2. This implies
πN\I (n− s) = A (n− s) (1 + k∗ (n− s))
αρ
1−α
> A (n− s) (1 + k∗ (n− s))
αρ
1−α − k∗ (n− s)
= πI (n− s)
i.e., if γ = n−s firms are better oﬀ not investing as they receive the spill with probability
1. On the other hand, if γ = 0, we have that
πN\I (0) = A (0)
∙
s
n− β∗(0) (1 + k
∗ (0))
αρ
1−α +
n− β∗(0)− s
n− β∗(0)
¸
< A (0) (1 + k∗ (0))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (0)
= πI (0)
is satisfied for s small enough. So, by continuity there exists γmi ∈ [0, n− s] such that
(8) is satisfied. From γmi, we can derive βmi ≡ β∗(γmi) and kmi ≡ k∗(γmi). Finally, one
can determine the price charged by contractor j to perform the task. Observe that the
chosen contractor will extract βmiφ
¡
(1 + kmi)
−ρ , βmi
¢
as a surplus from the market for
information. The initial competition among contractors guarantees that the price for the
task is τ j = −
βmiφ((1+kmi)−ρ,βmi)
n .
Third step (uniqueness): To show uniqueness, let us first show that there cannot be
equilibria where either a zero-measured set of firms invest or a zero-measured set of firms
do not invest. Then, I will show that the measure γmi that guarantees indiﬀerence between
the two sets (as determined in the previous step) is uniquely identified. First, recall that for
s < s we have πI (0) > πN\I (0) , so if a zero-measured set of firms invest in equilibrium,
one of the other firms would have a profitable deviation in investing (notice that this is
true even if the set of investing firm includes only one firm, so for small s we can rule out
an equilibrium in which only one firm invests and outsources). Also, notice that if s > 0,
then πN\I (n− s) > πI (n− s) , as if a (n − s)-measured set of firms invest, a firm
would have a profitable deviation in waiting for the spill. Then, in equilibrium it must be
the case that the two sets of firms are both non zero-measured. To guarantee that γ is
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uniquely determined, it is enough to show that the functions πN\I (γ) and πI (γ) cannot
cross twice. To see this, observe that, by the Envelope theorem, we have
dπI (γ)
dγ
=
∂A (γ)
∂γ
c∗ (γ)−
α
1−α
and
dπN\I (γ)
dγ
=
∂A (γ)
∂γ
K (γ) +A (γ)
∂K (γ)
∂γ
whereK (γ) ≡ 1+ sn−γ−β∗(γ)
³
c∗ (γ)−
α
1−α − 1
´
. Notice that ∂A(γ)∂γ =
∂A(γ)
∂(γ+β∗(γ))
∂(γ+β∗(γ))
∂γ
and ∂K(γ)∂γ =
∂K(γ+β∗(γ))
∂(γ+β∗(γ))
∂(γ+β∗(γ))
∂γ . After some algebraic manipulations, one can see
that ∂A(γ)∂(γ+β∗(γ)) < 0 and
∂K(γ+β∗(γ))
∂(γ+β∗(γ)) > 0. Moreover, notice that it must be the case
that ∂(γ+β
∗(γ))
∂γ > 0 for all γ (to see this, suppose
∂(γ+β∗(γ))
∂γ < 0 for some interval
of γ, and notice that in that interval it should be the case that k(γ)∂γ > 0, which, to-
gether with ∂(γ+β
∗(γ))
∂γ < 0, would imply that for a positive change of γ the function
ϕ (β) =
E(1−α)

c
−α
1−α−1

(γ+β)

c
−α
1−α−1

+n
shifts upward, which would imply β∗ to increase, which is in
contradiction with ∂(γ+β
∗(γ))
∂γ < 0). All these considerations imply that
dπI(γ)
dγ < 0 and
that for all γ ∈ [0.n] we have
dπN\I (γ)
dγ
>
∂A (γ)
∂ (γ + β∗ (γ))
∂ (γ + β∗ (γ))
∂γ
K (γ + β∗ (γ))
>
∂A (γ)
∂ (γ + β∗ (γ))
∂ (γ + β∗ (γ))
∂γ
c∗ (γ)−
α
1−α
=
dπI (γ)
dγ
which guarantees that πN\I (γ) and πI (γ) cannot cross twice¥
Proof of Proposition 9: Let us show first that if s = 0 it is impossible to have
a monopolistic market for information in equilibrium. Let γ be the measure of investing
firms and β be the measure of firms that buy the information from a contractor j. The
willingness to pay of a non-investing firm for a technology c reachable with investment k
is
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φ (c, β)=
E (1− α)
(γ + β)
h
c
−α
1−α − 1
i
+ n
h
(1 + k)
αρ
1−α − 1
i
where c is the level of technology adopted by the investing firms and the other buying
firms and reachable with the investment k. In equilibrium any investing firms invests k
such that
Eαρ
(γ + β)
h¡
1 + k
¢ αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ n
(1 + k)
αρ−1+α
1−α = 1 (9)
Notice that in equilibrium all the investing firms adopt the same technology. This
implies that k = k. Keeping k constant, it is possible to integrate the LHS of (9) with
respect to k between 0 and k. We have
ϕ
¡
β, k
¢
=
E (1− α)
h¡
1 + k
¢ αρ
1−α − 1
i
(γ + β)
h¡
1 + k
¢ αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ n
=
Z k
0
Eαρ
(γ + β)
h¡
1 + k
¢ αρ
1−α − 1
i
+ n
(1 + v)
αρ−1+α
1−α dv
> k
where the last inequality is guaranteed by identity (9), by k = k, and by the fact that
the LHS of (9) is decreasing in k (as guaranteed by Assumption 1). This guarantees that
if s = 0 investing in technology always strictly dominates buying a technology from a
monopolistic contractor.¥
Proof of Proposition 10: The fact that k0 is the minimal investment level comes
from the fact that when the measure of investing firms is maximal, i.e. γ = n, the marginal
return on the investment is the minimum possible, and so is the investment level. To show
that kn > kmi, let us first show that γn < γmi + βmi + σ. To show it, recall that the
condition defining γn is
A (γn) (1 + k
∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (γn)−t = A (γn) (10)
Let us define a function Ψ : [0, n]→ R as follows
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Ψ (x)≡ A (x) (1 + k∗ (x))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (x)−A (x)
∙
s
n− x+ s (1 + k
∗ (x))
αρ
1−α +
n− x
n− x+ s
¸
Observe that from condition (8) we have Ψ (γmi + βmi + s) = 0. Since Ψ (0) > 0 and
Ψ (n) < 0, if Ψ (γn) > 0, then γmi + βmi + s > γn. However, if s is small enough, by
(10) we have
Ψ (γn) = A (γn) (1 + k
∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (γn)
−A (γn)
h
s
n−γn+s
(1 + k∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α + n−γnn−x+s
i
> A (γn) (1 + k
∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α −k∗ (γn)−t
−A (γn)
h
s
n−γn+s
(1 + k∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α + n−γnn−x+s
i
= A (γn)−A (γn)
h
s
n−γn+s
(1 + k∗ (γn))
αρ
1−α + n−γnn−x+s
i
→ 0
which guarantees Ψ (γn) > 0. Since γn < γmi + βmi + σ, the claim kn > kmi follows
from the fact that in equilibrium, if x is the measure of firms adopting a technology reached
by k∗, we have dk
∗(x)
dx < 0¥
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